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COMMENT

CONNELL: BROADENING LABOR'S ANTITRUST
LIABILITY WHILE NARROWING ITS
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
PROVISO PROTECTION
"The applicability of the Sherman Act to union activities has been one
of the most disputed legal issues of this century."' Undoubtedly, Professor Winter in penning this statement foresaw a continuing controversy
around this issue. The Supreme Court's most recent incursion into this
area has done little to extinguish the controversy. Through its 1975
decision in Connell ConstructionCo. v. Plumbers Local 100, g the Court
revived the apparent anomaly of applying an act to prevent restraints of
trade against organizations whose effectiveness lies in their ability to
impose such restraints.
The nature of the problem can be simply formulated:
A central aim of the antitrust laws is the promotion of competition. A central aim of collective bargaining is the elimination of
competition-According to classical trade union theory, the
elimination of wage competition among all employees doing the
same job in the same industry. Given these disparate aims, the
antitrust laws and collective bargaining will almost invariably
tend to clash. To harmonize them, the type of competition
which the law is intended to foster must be carefully distinguished from the type of competition
which union-employer
3
bargaining can properly displace .
Accommodation of the national policy favoring collective bargaining
embodied in the labor laws and the national policy favoring competition
and efficiency embodied in the antitrust laws, has been one of the most
1. Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 14 (1963).
2. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
3. St. Antoine, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws, 115 Prrr. LEGAL J. 25
(1967).
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difficult and delicate tasks facing the Court. The Court's handling of the
problem in the past has been inconsistent and often at odds with
congressional intent. The Connell decision reflects a concern for the
growing power of unions to affect the commercial affairs of business
organizations through secondary pressures. This concern resulted in a
substantial narrowing of labor's exemption from the antitrust laws and a
narrowing of the construction industry proviso.
Connell is primarily an antitrust decision and much of the commentary
has tended to treat it as such.5 This approach, however, overlooks the
important changes Connell has thrust upon the course of law under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and, in particular, the construction industry proviso in section 8(e). 6 This Comment examines not only
Connell's impact on the regulation of union activity under the antitrust
laws but also its effect on the course of law under the NLRA.
I.

EARLY APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO UNION ACTIVITIES

With the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, Congress declared illegal
"[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade." 7 Although a provision excluding labor unions from the Act was
eliminated in the course of major revision of the bill in committee, 8 this
did not mean that the Sherman Act was to be applied to anticompetitive
union activities. Indeed, the Act was largely directed toward business
monopolies and trade restraints. 9 In the early 1900's, however, the courts
proceeded to hold unions liable for antitrust violations to the same extent
as manufacturers or distributors if they restained interstate commerce.' 0
4. The construction industry proviso is an exemption for construction industry unions
carved out of § 8(c)'s ban on secondary "hot cargo" agreements, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e)
(1970). "Hot cargo" agreements are those in which the union agrees with an employer not
to handle the goods of another employer.
5. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975); Comment,
Labor's Antitrust Immunity After Connell, 25 Am. U.L. REV. 971 (1976); Comment,
Congress and the Court at Cross Purposes: Labor's Antitrust Exemption, 7 LoY. CHI.
L.J. 782 (1976); Note, Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.
REV. 217 (1976); Note, Labor-Antitrust Law After Connell Construction Co., 35 FED. B.J.
133 (1976); Note, Labor's Antitrust Exemption After Connell, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 852 (1975).
Notable exceptions are: Bartosic, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term: The Allocation of
Power in Deciding Labor Law Policy, 62 VA. L. REV. 533 (1976); St. Antoine, Connell:
Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REV. 603 (1976).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
7. Sherman Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), (original version at ch. 647, 29 Stat. 209
(1890)).
8. See E. BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN AcT 3-54 (1930).

9. Id.
10. See A.

MASON, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE LAW 133-65 (1925).
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The Supreme Court's initial reading of the Sherman Act was a literal
one: The Act applied to and pronounced illegal every contract or combination in restraint of trade among the several states; no exception or
limitation could be adduced without writing into the Act what Congress
had omitted." This approach was evident in Loewe v. Lawlor, 12 the
famous Danbury Hatters case, in which the Sherman Act was held
applicable to a union's secondary activity in urging a consumer boycott
against a struck hat manufacturer. Although the legislative history of the
Sherman Act implied that the Act was not to be applied to labor unions in
order to compel their possible elimination, 3 that was what the Court
nearly accomplished.' 4 The Court had applied the Act literally, declaring
that the combination of union members had acted to restrain interstate
trade.' 5 The Court, therefore, embarked on a policy of deciding which
labor activities would be subject to the antitrust laws.
II.

ESTABLISHING LABOR'S EXEMPTION FROM THE ANTITRUST LAWS

In belated recognition of the problem of subjecting peaceful union
activity directed against the primary employer to the prohibitions of the
Sherman Act, Congress passed the Clayton Act which sought to protect
certain labor activities from the reach of the Sherman Act.' 6 However, in
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,17 the Court dispelled any notion
that all collective bargaining and peaceful concerted activities would be
exempted from the antitrust laws. The Court narrowly restricted the
statutory exemption to disputes between employers and their immediate
employees, thus removing "stranger" picketing from its reach.' 8 In his
11. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 312, 326-29 (1897).
12. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
13. Note, Antitrust Laws and Union Power, 16 U. FLA. L. REV. 103, 105 (1%3).

14. See id. Three years after this decision, the danger became critical when the Court in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911), held that combinations judged to
restrain trade illegally could be dissolved by the government's prosecution under the
Sherman Act.
15. 208 U.S. at 300-01.
16. Clayton Act §§ 6, 20, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 738 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17, 29 U.S.C.

§ 52 (1970). Section 6 provides that:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor . . . organizations, .

.

. or to forbid or restrain individual

members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations . . . be held to be illegal combinations or
* conspiracies in restraint of trade under the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970). The Clayton Act provided the first exemption from the antitrust

laws.
17.

254 U.S. 443 (1921).

18. Id. at 472-74. This distinction between primary and secondary activity seems to
have originated with Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
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dissent, Justice Brandeis chided the Court for having overridden the
intention of Congress to remove the federal courts from the adjudication
of antitrust claims arising from peaceful concerted activities. 9 In subsequent cases involving refusals by union members to handle or work on
goods furnished by another employer which the union was seeking to
20
organize, the Court relied on Duplex to find antitrust violations.
The enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 2 1 in 1932 and the Wagner
Act 22 in 1935 marked the inception of the present national policy with
respect to labor-management relations. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, in
particular, represented a further statutory development of labor's exemption from the antitrust laws. Although it was arguable that the
passage of this Act and the complementary Wagner Act indicated a
congressional intent to deprive the federal courts of the power to affect
national labor policy, 3 the Supreme Court in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,24 indicated that a violation of the antitrust laws would be found if a
union engaged in conduct which had or was intended to have an appreci25
able effect upon the price or supply of goods in interstate commerce.
19. 254 U.S. at 485-87. In effect, Justice Brandeis was asserting that the union's
interest in self-preservation justified the secondary activities. The Duplex majority effectively dismantled §§ 6 & 20 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), by
declaring that the Act only codified existing case law. Section 20 was construed to apply
only if a dispute over "terms and conditions of employment" existed between the
employer and his immediate employees. Id. at 470-72. See Meltzer, Labor Unions,
Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 659, 665 (1965).
20. E.g., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927). In
United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926), the Court considered the union's strike of the
primary employer an indirect burden on interstate commerce, and the union's far less
effective appeals campaign to the public for a consumer boycott violative of the antitrust
laws. In the first Coronado Coal Co. case, (UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344
(1922)), the Court reevaluated its prior determination following the introduction of facts
demonstrating that the union's specific objective was to prevent Coronado Coal from
entering interstate marketing arteries. Id. at 410-11. Thus, a primary strike would violate
the antitrust laws if the union specifically intended to restrain the entry of nonunion
products into the market.
21. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970), drastically limits the power
of federal courts to issue injunctions in both primary and secondary labor disputes.
22. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (current version at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970)), gives affirmative protection and encouragement to union
organization and collective bargaining.
23. When read together, the two statutes may be interpreted as enunciating a general
intent to establish a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme for labor relations. It has
been argued that since the judicially administered antitrust laws may be utilized to thwart
the institution of collective bargaining protected by the labor acts, the regulatory scheme
contemplated by Congress could best be effectuated by withholding the conduct of labor
regulation from the jurisdiction of the courts. For a general background in this area, see F.
FRANKFURTER &.N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 231-78 (1930).
24. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
25. Id. at 492-97.
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The Court held that a union did not violate the Sherman Act by engaging
in a violent primary sit-down strike. Further, Justice Stone noted that the
Sherman Act was aimed only at "some form of restraint upon commercial competition in the marketing of goods or services" 26 and against
contracts "for the restriction or suppression of competition in the market." ,27 The Court noted that labor unions inevitably restrain competition
among employees regarding the price at which their labor is sold, but
held this not to be the kind of market restraint at which the Sherman Act
was aimed. 28 The Court, however, stopped short of according unions a
broad immunity, noting that the union's obstructions to interstate
commerce had not affected price and had not been so intended. 29 This
reservation indicated that an obstruction of interstate commerce of sufficient degree could subject unions to the antitrust laws. 30 Thus the Court
retained the power to judge when the union's efforts were too successful. Since such success would tend to arise only in the larger industries,
the Court's approach threatened to subvert the objective of the labor
statutes in establishing a balance of power between unions and big
business."
A hoped for exemption for labor from the Sherman Act failed to
materialize completely, though the Court failed to enunciate any clear
principle of when antitrust liability would attach. 32 It did note that application of the Sherman Act would be confined to labor activities affecting
the product market and not the labor market. 33
Subsequently, in United States v. Hutcheson, 34 the Court seemingly
shifted its focus from the effect of union activity on the market to the
26. Id.at 495.
27. Id.at 497.
28. Id. at 502-03. The Court stated that the Sherman Act was not directed at "an
elimination of price competition based on differences in labor standards." Id. at 503.
29. Id. at 501-02. Moreover, the Court refused to vary liability based upon whether the
alleged unlawful activity was committed by the union or management. Id. at 512.
30. Id. at 511,512.
31. See Meltzer, supra note 19, at 667.
32. The Apex opinion expressed two divergent concepts. First, the Court acknowledged that strikes by an organization were the traditional means for achieving benefits at
least for conventional objectives, such as wages, and were not to be considered unlawful.
Secondly, the Court also noted the lack of an effect on prices. These notions, buttressed
by language throughout the opinion indicating that the Sherman Act was aimed solely at
business combinations and trusts, revealed a Court floundering in an area in which case
law and statutes conflicted. See 310 U.S. at 492, 493 n.15, 494, 497.
33. Drawing a line between the markets can be a difficult process, and the difficulty is
compounded by the fact that the impact of wage costs on supply and price invariably
results in an intertwining of the two markets. See Meltzer, supra note 19, at 667-68.
34. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
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nature of the activity itself. Hutcheson involved a criminal prosecution
against officials of the carpenters' union who, in support of workassignment demands conflicting with those of machinists working for the
Anheuser-Busch brewery in St. Louis, precipitated picketing, a strike of
carpenters doing construction work for other companies on the property,
and a boycott of Anheuser-Busch beer. Discarding the Apex approach of
whether the strike and boycott were illegal restraints upon the product
market, the Court read section 20 of the Clayton Act 3 5 and section 4 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act 36 as establishing an exemption from antitrust
liability for peaceful concerted activity. 3 The Court held these concerted
activities exempted under the Clayton Act and additionally noted that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was intended by Congress to override prior judicial narrowing of the Clayton Act's sweep.38 In an oft-quoted passage,
the Court declared:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups, the licit and illicit under § 20 are not to be
distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are the
39
means.

Thus, labor's exemption was carved out by a judicial decree. So long as
these requirements are met, the dispute is within the statutory exemption
created by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, and a party to such a
dispute is immune from liability under the antitrust laws even if its
actions impose restraints on competition in the product market.
In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, ]BEW,40 the Court was faced with a
union-employer combination which had achieved price and market
controls. 4' The union had agreed with the New York City electrical
equipment manufacturers and contractors that all electrical contractors
would buy exclusively from local unionized manufacturers. In return,
the union would use its economic weaponry to insure the expediency of
local manufacture.4 2 This case was clearly within the proscriptions set
35. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
37. 312 U.S. at 232-36.
38. Id. at 235-36. "The underlying aim of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to restore the
broad purpose which Congress thought it had formulated in the Clayton Act but which
was frustrated, so Congress believed, by unduly restrictive judicial construction." Id.
39. Id. at 232.
40. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
41. Id. at 799-800.
42. The effect of the agreement was to bar the sale of electrical equipment produced
outside the city to contractors in the city, thus leading to an extraordinary increase in the
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forth in Apex and Hutcheson and the Court had little difficulty holding
that the combination of manufacturers and contractors violated the Sherman Act.43 In dictum, however, the Court sought to retain a broad
immunity for a union acting within the reach of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. The opinion noted that a "labor dispute" existed; a peaceful strike,
therefore, in support of a union-initiated boycott would not have been
illegal or enjoinable by a federal court, since such conduct would have
been clearly protected by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts."
Standing alone, therefore, the employers' compliance with the collective
45
bargaining agreement's boycott provision might also be protected.
At the time of the Taft-Hartley amendments" to the National Labor
Relations Act, Apex, Hutcheson, and Allen Bradley could be read, with
a degree of certainty, to indicate that a union's activity is immune from
antitrust liability if it is in furtherance of the union's "self-interest" and
not a knowing part of a larger business combination designed to increase
47
price or regulate supply in the product rather than labor market.
Against this backdrop of case law, in 1947 Congress amended the
NLRA to curb what it considered to be abuses of union power, including
the use of "secondary" pressures imposed on firms dealing with an
employer with which the union has a dispute.' Prior to the passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act, Congress considered and rejected proposals for
broadening labor unions' antitrust liability. Indeed, the original House
version of the Act would have subjected unions to antitrust liability but
was deleted prior to final enactment.49 Instead, Congress made unlawful
business of the New York manufacturers, a dramatic increase in the price of their
electrical equipment, increased profits for both the manufacturers and contractors, and an

increase in wages for electricians. Id.
43. 325 U.S. at 807, 810.
44. Id. at 809-10.
45. Id.
46. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 29 U.S.C.).
'47. Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945), exemplifies the broad extent of a union's
exemption at this time. In that case, a Teamsters' local had imposed a secondary boycott
on an employer's principal customers primarily out of spite. Although the employer
ultimately lost the customers' business as a result of the boycott, the Court found the
union's activity not within the parameters of the federal antitrust laws. The Court declared: "That which Congress has recognized as lawful, this Court has no constitutional
power to declare unlawful, by arguing that Congress has accorded too much power to
labor organizations." Id. at 825 n.1.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970).
49. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1947), reprintedin [1947]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1135. The Conference Committee Report noted that the
bill
contained a provision amending the Clayton Act so as to withdraw the exemption
of labor organizations under the antitrust laws when such organizations engaged
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certain coercive secondary labor activities (including secondary boycotts), subjected them to injunctions, 50 and provided for private recov5
ery of damages resulting from secondary activities. '
III.

SETTING THE STAGE FOR CONNELL: PENNINGTON,
JEWEL TEA, AND UNION INTERESTS

The interests which the unions seek to protect in any labor dispute are
usually much the same. Unions traditionally seek better wages, better
working conditions, and job security for their members. Pursuit of these
interests was generally protected under the Allen Bradley doctrine.
Under that doctrine, certain methods of protecting the interests of union
members were prohibited because they involved use of the labor exemp52
tion to protect management schemes which violated the antitrust laws.
Under Hutcheson, the union could still seek to prevent the use of
nonunion labor, in order to put nonunion employers out of business and
to dispense with technological innovation which would reduce the number of employees needed. In UMW v. Pennington 3 and Local 189,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,54 the Court reopened the
practice abandoned in Hutcheson of judicially determining the legitima55
cy of these labor objectives and interests.
in combination or conspiracy in restrain[t] of commerce where one of the purposes or a necessary effect of the combination or conspiracy was to join or
combine with any person to fix prices, allocate costs, restrict production, distribution, or competition, or impose restrictions or conditions, upon the purchase,
sale, or use of any product, material, machine, or equipment, or to engage in any
unlawful concerted activity.
93 CONG. REc. 6380 (1947). The Committee report then explained the omission of such
provisions. "Since the matters dealt with in this section have to a large measure been
effectuated through the use of boycotts, and since the conference agreement contains
effective provisions directly dealing with boycotts themselves, this provision is omitted
from the conference agreement." 93 CONG. REC. 6380 (1947).
Commentators have disagreed over congressional intent in abandoning proposals which
would have eliminated the Clayton Act's labor exemption. See Winter, supra note 1, at
70-73 (Professor Winter argues that rejection of the antitrust provisions indicates that
Congress, in making secondary activities violative of the labor laws, intended the labor
law remedies to be exclusive). But see Meltzer, supra note 19, at 701. (Professor
Meltzer expresses the same theory as Justice Powell expresses in Connell, that the
application of the antitrust laws was not precluded by enactment of labor law remedies).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970).
52. For instance, the Allen Bradley principle forbids the union to further the interests
of its members by helping an employer group to gain monopoly power in a product market
through non-competitive allocation of contracts and rigged bidding. See Local 175, IBEW
v. United States, 219 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955).
53. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
54. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
55. The Court split into three groups of three in Pennington and Jewel Tea, with
Justices White, Goldberg, and Douglas writing the opinion for their respective groups with
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In Pennington, the Court found that the United Mine Workers forfeited their nonstatutory exemption by agreeing with the large mine
owners in a multiemployer unit to impose a certain wage scale on small
owners, even though the terms imposed were subject to mandatory
bargaining. The union, which had invested in certain mines, had compromised its demands against mechanization and control of working time in
order to obtain industry-wide wage increases. The facts showed a pattern
of union-owner cooperation to drive small owners out of the coal market.
The major defect in the multiemployer agreement with the union was
the agreement to impose "specified labor standards outside the bargaining unit

.

.

.[f]or the salient characteristic of such agreements is that the

union surrenders its freedom of action with respect to its bargaining
policy.''56

The conspiracy aspect of Pennington made Hutcheson, for the most
part, inapplicable. However, one could argue that the union's desire to
eliminate competition based on differences in labor standards brought
the case within the parameters of the Apex decision. Implicit in this
argument is the concept that the purpose of the agreement is irrelevant to
the consideration of whether the agreement qualifies for the labor exemption. That argument was too extreme for the Court. Justice White,
speaking for the Court, noted that a union has a duty to bargain over
mandatory subjects such as wages, and conceded that even an agreement
with a multiemployer bargaining unit would not violate the antitrust
laws.57 However, the union had undertaken to join with employers for
the predatory purpose of eliminating competitors from the industry, thus
invoking the proscriptions of Allen Bradley. Furthermore, Justice White
asserted the relatively novel idea that the statutory duty to bargain exists
only on a unit-by-unit basis. 58 By binding itself in an agreement with the
large operators to make certain wage demands upon employers in a
different bargaining unit, the UMW forfeited its exemption. 9
Justice Douglas, joined in his dissent by Justices Black and Clark,
understood the Court to premise a finding of antitrust liability on the
existence of a predatory purpose. His opinion, however, indicates that it
Justice White's opinion being adopted as that of the Court in both cases. This is significant, for in Connell it is Justice White who provides the critical fifth vote.
56. 381 U.S. at 668.
57. See id. at 665 & n.2.
58. Id. By determining that a duty to bargain existed only within a unit, the Court
apparently ruled out the possibility of a union establishing standards outside a unit. See St.
Antoine, supra note 5, at 609.
59. 381 U.S. at 665. The union, however, could achieve the same predatory purpose on
a unit-by-unit basis according to Justice White's reasoning.
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is immaterial whether the condemned agreement results from successive
or joint negotiations; if there is consciously parallel conduct, an industrywide agreement with a wage scale exceeding the ability of some
operators to pay would be prima facie evidence of such illegal intent. 60
Justice Goldberg, speaking for Justices Harlan and Stewart in dissent,
would have held the agreement exempt by granting broad immunity to
union-employer agreements covering mandatory subjects of bargaining. 6 1 Since the agreement covered wages and mechanization, it fit
squarely within the terms and conditions of employment about which
unions and employers must bargain. Moreover, the blanket condemnation of extra-unit agreements ignored the realities of collective bargaining and represented, according to Justice Goldberg, an unwarranted
intrusion into the machinery of collective bargaining, since such an
intrusion would presumably be based on the judge's own social and
economic predilections. 62 A conflict, therefore, existed since unions
traditionally seek to excise competition from the dictation of wages by
imposing uniform labor standards on competitors and by extending the
scope of organization. All the Justices apparently agreed that an agreement even between a single union and single employer setting the price
(and not wages) at which the employer was to sell its goods would
constitute a direct restraint on the product market and violate the antitrust laws.
Setting the stage for Connell, Pennington raised serious doubts about
the extra-unit union-employer agreements including "most favored nation" clauses.63 Such clauses protect a favored employer's competitive
position by guaranteeing that more favorable terms will not be accorded
another employer unless extended to the favored employer. In effect,
the clauses restrain the labor market and "impose a certain wage scale on
other bargaining units. "6 Under such a clause, the union forfeits its
ability to bargain collectively with successive employers according to
60. 381 U.S. at 735-36 (Douglas, J., with Black and Clark, JJ., dissenting). Justice
Douglas, by invoking the "conscious parallelism" doctrine of Interstate Circuit v. United
States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), would infer an antitrust conspiracy from evidence of a
multiemployer collective bargaining agreement and injury to an employer group. 381 U.S.
at 735-36.
61. Id. at 731-35 (Goldberg, J., with Harlan and Stewart, JJ., dissenting but concurring
in the result). Justice Goldberg wrote only a single opinion for both Pennington and Jewel
Tea.
62. Id.
63. "Most favored nation" clauses are fairly common in labor contracts, especially
those of the construction industry. See Feller & Anker, Analysis of Impact of Supreme
Court's Antitrust Holdings, 59 L.R.R.M. 103 (1965). Such a clause was considered
relevant in determining Local 100's liability in Connell.
64. 381 U.S. at 665-66.
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individual circumstances. 65 The "most favored nation" clause would
seem to lack antitrust immunity except that Justice White indicated that
only predatory intent subjected the clause to the antitrust laws. 66 The
contractual clause in Pennington provided that the union would impose
upon all other coal operators in the area the terms of the agreement
without regard to their ability to pay. 67 A "most favored nation" clause,
on the other hand, is designed to assure that the previous employer could
be relieved of any disadvantage if the union negotiated more favorable
wage and benefit levels.6 8
The National Labor Relations Board has held that "most favored
nation" clauses are a mandatory subject of bargaining. 69 Simply because
a union and an employer must bargain over a subject does not mean they
can lawfully reach an agreement that is intended to restrain competition
in the product market. The NLRB has no power to dictate the subject
matter or substantive terms of an agreement. The NLRB may decide
whether collective bargaining took place, but it may not determine what
should or should not have been included in the union contract. 71 If the
NLRB decides that a demanded clause concerns a mandatory bargaining
subject, the question for decision is not whether agreement, on the
proposed clause would violate the antitrust laws, but whether rejection
of the demand was made in good faith. Therefore, a union agreement
containing a mandatory subject cannot, by itself, be the basis for an
71
exemption from the antitrust laws.
Pennington indicated that a violation of the antitrust laws might be
found when a union-employer agreement covering wages has as its
65. Id. at 666.
66. Id.at 665-66.
67. Id. at 665. Because of the union's substantial investment in the larger firms charged
with the predatory price-cutting, the union easily benefited by such a clause. See generally
Note, Conflict of Interest Problems Arising From Union Pension FundLoans, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 162 (1967).

68. The NLRB said as much in Dolly Madison Indus., Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1037, 1038
(1970). The Board went on to hold that "most favored nation" clauses were mandatory
subjects of bargaining upon which an employer could insist, absent a predatory purpose.
Id.
69. See note 68 supra.
70. Consumers' Research, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 57, 74; 1 L.R.R.M. 457, 469 (1936).
Though it expresses the general policy of the NLRB, the proposition is not strictly
accurate, since by NLRB decisions employers and unions may not include in their
contracts provisions that are not in accordance with federal laws. Southern S.S. Co. v.
NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 46-47 (1942). See also American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302, 1309;
14 L.R.R.M. 54, 68-69 (1944).
71. The union in Pennington argued that an agreement with one group of employers
restraining freedom of the union to deal with other employer groups was sanctioned by
existing national labor policy if the subject matter of the agreement was a mandatory
subject of bargaining. 381 U.S. at 665.
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purpose the elimination of competition. 72 In Jewel Tea,7 the Court was
faced with a labor contract that forbade supermarkets to open between
the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. for the purpose of selling butchered
meat. Justice White, announcing the judgment of the Court, dismissed
the conspiracy issue, holding that it was not properly before the Court
since the trial court had discovered no evidence to sustain Jewel Tea's
conspiracy charges, nor had this issue been considered on appeal.7 4
Moreover, he could not establish a Pennington-type liability since the
operating restriction was not the "result of a bargain between the unions
and some employers directed against other employers, but [was] what
the unions deemed to be in their own labor interests." '75 The Court
observed that if the company could not market meat at night without
affecting the daytime hours or assigned tasks of the union butchers, the
marketing hours restriction could constitute a legitimate concern of the
members within the unit.76 Considering the union's interest, the Court
held that the marketing hours restriction was not like the fixing of
product prices but was rather "intimately related to wages, hours, and
working conditions." 77 This "immediate and direct" concern of union
members would be protected if the terms imposed by the union could be
said to be "intimately related" to legitimate union interests, and those
terms went no further than necessary in protecting those interests. In this
posture, the interests of the union members would outweigh the relative
impact of the agreement on the product market. If the relationship
between the contract restriction and the workload of the butchers was
minimal, the contract would fall outside the labor exemption and would
be scrutinized to determine whether it constituted a substantive viola78
tion.
In Jewel Tea, Justice White reemphasized that a union acting alone and
79
not at the behest of any employers was entitled to the labor exemption.
In combination with the predatory intent language in Pennington, this
72. Id. at 665-66.

73. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
74. Id. at 681-83.

75. Id. at 688.
76. Id. at 690.
77. Id. at 689-90.
78. Id. at 689-91. In formulating the issue in Jewel Tea, Justice White ignored the trial
court's finding that the collective bargaining agreement provided that "the unions agree
not to enter into a contract with any other employer designating lower wages, or longer
hours, or any more favorable conditions of employment." See 215 F. Supp. 839, 842
(N.D. I11.1963). This finding clearly brings Jewel Tea within the parameters of the extra
unit bargaining admonition of Pennington.
79. 381 U.S. at 688-90.
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factor indicates that the identity of the initiator of a particularly suspect
clause in a labor contract is an important factor in determining whether
the union was pursuing solely its self-interest. Allen Bradley buttresses
this conclusion by indicating that a union is liable if it joins a preexisting
conspiracy of employers to restrain the product market. 80 Thus, extremely fine evidentiary points may prove crucial to the union's retention
of an exemption under the antitrust laws.
Justice White also reintroduced the heavily criticized process of judicial balancing of labor interests and antitrust law enforcement stating
that the "crucial determinant" Was not the agreement's form but its
relative impact on the product market balanced against the interest of
union members in obtaining it. 81 The danger of such an approach is that
judges are thrust into the inappropriate role of usurping legislative pre82
rogatives in economic policymaking.
Reading the Allen Bradley, Pennington, and Jewel Tea cases together,
some general principles can be discerned. If a union joins an existing
employer conspiracy to fix prices, allocate customers, or exclude entry
into the product market under the guise of a collective bargaining agreement, Allen Bradley clearly dictates that both employers and the union
violate the antitrust laws. 83 The tainted clauses will be unenforceable and
illegal, and union concerted activity to implement the clauses will be
unlawful and enjoinable. Pennington indicates that the existence of a
collective bargaining agreement does not alter the legality of such an
agreement, since the agreement designedly extended into and affected
the product market. 8
There will be instances, however, particularly in multiemployer bargaining units, in which these principles will not be conclusive, even
though no specific conspiracy to tinker with competition in the product
market exists, but the anticompetitive effects flowing from an agreement
are foreseeable. Since the reduction in competition results from union
conduct which is lawful on its face, Apex would appear to govern and
warrant the application of a labor exemption. A useful example is presented in Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 85 a case in which a
dairy sought to compete with other large dairies making house-to-house
80. See notes 40-47 & accompanying text supra.
81. 381 U.S. at 690 n.5.
82. See Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A PreliminaryAnalysis, 104 U. PA. L.
REV. 252, 272 (1955).
83. See notes 40-45 & accompanying text supra.
84. See notes 56-68 & accompanying text supra.
85. 260 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1958).
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deliveries by making bulk deliveries to supermarkets. The union representing the dairy employers negotiated a wage provision which so sharply increased the earnings of the employees making supermarket deliveries, that this form of competition was made economically unfeasible. 6 The Eighth Circuit, finding no conspiracy by the union with the
employers, concluded that the union acted alone in seeking legitimate
labor objectives, and sustained the agreement against antitrust attack by
the affected dairy.8 7
Deep uncertainties remained after the Court's opinions in Pennington
and Jewel Tea concerning how and when liability would attach to particular union conduct. In Pennington, the Court had condemned extra-unit
bargaining about wages and working conditions, since it was motivated
by a predatory purpose, but in Jewel Tea it upheld a marketing restriction
because its purpose related to and protected a legitimate union concern.
These uncertainties were further complicated by the Court's five-four
decision ten years later in Connell-a case which raises perplexing
questions concerning the reach of the labor exemption.
IV.

MODIFYING PENNINGTON AND JEWEL TEA:
THE CONNELL DECISION

The facts underlying the Connell decision were fairly simple. Plumbers Local 100 had requested Connell Construction Company, a general
contractor, to restrict subcontracts for its plumbing and mechanical work
to firms that had a collective bargaining agreement with the Local."8
When Connell refused, a lone picket was placed at the construction site
forcing construction to a halt. 89 Connell brought suit in a Texas state
court to enjoin the picketing as a violation of the state's antitrust laws.
Local 100 removed the case to federal court and, under protest, Connell
signed the agreement and amended its complaint to assert violations of
sections l(a) and 2 of the Sherman Act. 9° The district court found the
agreement authorized by section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations
86. Id. at 48-49.
87. Id.at 55.
88. Local 100, in turn, was a party to a multiemployer collective bargaining agreement
with the Mechanical Contractor's Association of Dallas, a group representing 75 mechanical contractors. 421 U.S. at 619-20.
89. Id. at 620. The union, however, had no intention of organizing Connell's employees and therefore could not claim that its picketing was protected by § 8(b)(7) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1970), which covers recognitional and organizational
picketing.
90. 421 U.S. at 620-21. Because the union had ceased its picketing, the Supreme Court
found it unnecessary to address Connell's requests for injunctive relief. Id. at 637 n. 19.
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Act (NLRA) 91 and thus exempt from the antitrust laws. 92 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's result without reaching the section 8(e) issue. 93
The Supreme Court reversed, five to four,94 on the question of antitrust liability of the union and remanded9 5 for a consideration of the
Sherman Act claims. The precise issue before the Court was twofold.

First, was the union subject to the federal antitrust laws when, without
conspiratorial intent or combination with a nonlabor group, it forced a
nonunionized general contractor to agree to restrict its subcontracting to
multiemployer bargaining agreement signatories? Second, was the agreement with the general contractor protected by the construction industry
proviso to section 8(e) and, if not, were damage remedies provided
exclusively by the NLRA?
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell declared that the union's
agreement was not exempt from the antitrust laws since it directly
restrained the product market and indiscriminately excluded nonunion
subcontractors from a portion of that market. 96 The agreement was also
held outside the ambit of the section 8(e) proviso, which the Court
interpreted as authorizing secondary boycott agreements only within the
context of a collective bargaining relationship and possible commonsitus relationships on particular jobsites. 97 Finally, the Court found that
91. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970). Section 8(e) outlawed "hot cargo" agreements, in which
the employer agreed not to do business with certain other employers except in the garment
and construction industries. The construction industry proviso states, in pertinent part:
"[N]othing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization
and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting
"
of work to be done at the site of the construction ....
92. 78 L.R.R.M. 3012, 3014 (N.D. Tex. 1971). The district court also found that the
Texas antitrust laws were preempted by federal legislation, id., and its finding was
affirmed on appeal. 483 F.2d 1154, 1175 (5th Cir. 1973).
93. 483 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1973). The court looked to Justice White's opinion in Jewel
Tea and determined that since the union did not conspire with a nonlabor group and acted
pursuant to its own self-interest, it was immunized from antitrust liability. Id. at 1166. In
effect, the union had demonstrated a "legitimate union interest."
94. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined. Id. at 638. In his brief dissent, Justice Douglas
stated that the absence of a viable conspiracy unalterably excluded application of the
antitrust laws to a union-employer agreement. Id.
95. Id. at 637.
96. Id. at 623. The majority noted that the restrictive agreements were designed to
force nonunion subcontractors out of the market, "even if their competitive advantages
were not derived from substandard wages and working conditions but rather from more
efficient operating methods." Id.
97. Id. at 633. The union had argued that the agreement was lawful under a literal
reading of the construction industry proviso. The parties involved were an employer and a
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the NLRA did not provide the exclusive remedies for a violation of
98
section 8(e).
In the Court's view, a clearly anticompetitive agreement without any
redeeming employee-employer relationship brought the agreement within the antitrust laws. While the Court recognized that labor policy required a tolerance for the lessening of business competition based on
differences in wages and working conditions,9 this policy apparently did
not extend to union organizing."'0
In perhaps its most important statement, the majority declared that the
Connell agreement was not exempt under the antitrust laws because it
imposed a direct restraint on the business market in ways which did not
"follow naturally from elimination of competition over wages and working conditions.' " 0 At first glance, the phrase seems similar to Justice
White's "intimately related" test.5°2 Upon closer examination, however,
that phrase is far broader and more ambiguous than the "intimately
related" test. The "intimately related" test provided a circle of areas in
which questionable union activities might gain antitrust immunity if it
could be demonstrated that the means used were intimately related to a
valid union interest. The majority's "natural effects" test'03 appears to
follow that course by retaining the need to show elimination of competition over wages and working conditions but dropping the intimate relations concept. The "follow naturally" phrase indicates that a definite
line separates exempt and nonexempt union activities, while the "intimate relation" test provided a much preferred balancing approach presenting the union with some leeway in the type of activities it could
utilize. Without offering any definition of the phrase, the majority
seemed to be propounding the existence of a per se liability, if, in
the absence of a collective bargaining relationship, union activity fails
labor organization; they were "in the construction industry"; and the agreement applied
to the subcontracting of work "to be done at the site of construction." Id. at 626-27.
98. Since there was no indication that Congress sought to preclude antitrust liability for
unlawful secondary boycott agreements, the Court held that the union's activity was not
subject exclusively to either the actual damages provision of § 303(b), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b)
(1970), or the injunctive relief provision of § 10(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970).
421 U.S. at 634.
99. Id. at 623.
100. Although it was presumptively lawful for the union to seek to organize subcontractors, the means used to attain that goal were questionable. Id. at 625.
101. Id. at 635.
102. See notes 77-78 & accompanying text supra.
103. See Note, Labor Law-Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions-Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 217, 224 (1976).
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to "follow naturally" from the elimination of competition over wages

and working conditions.'04
The majority went on to state that the agreement would indiscriminately exclude from the market both subcontractors who had efficient
operating methods and those offering substandard wages and working
conditions.1 5 The Court, however, afforded no explanation of how that
result would occur. Instead, it merely proceeded to find that the union's
multiemployer agreement was relevant to that issue because it contained
a "most favored nation" clause. The clause prescribed the exact terms
the union could seek in bargaining with newly organized subcontractors. 106 Thus, as the union expanded its membership to new subcontractors who were forced to unionize, competition between the subcontractors would be lessened, since all would be bound by the same terms.
Presumably the lessening of competition would extend not only to
wages, hours, and working conditions but to terms unrelated to those
labor conditions. 0 7 Thus, a lawful construction industry proviso signatory agreement would also be subject to antitrust liability because it
would restrict subcontracting on subjects unrelated to wages and working conditions.
The agreement would also have the impermissible effect of creating a
geographical enclave for local contractors by prohibiting subcontracting
not only with nonunion firms but with any firm not having a current
bargaining contract with the local.108 Yet every lawful signatory clause
presumably has this effect; and the Court noted that it might have been
lawful if included in a collective bargaining agreement. 19
In a further modification of the "intimately related" standard, the
majority incorporated into its new test the consideration of potential as
104.

Liability would attach only if the agreement was concluded outside both the

construction industry and a collective bargaining relationship. See Note, Labor-Antitrust
Law After Connell Construction Co., 35 FED. B.J. 133, 141 (1976), in which the author
argues that the absence of a collective bargaining agreement renders a union ineligible per
se for a nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust laws. The absence of a collective
bargaining relationship, however, is insufficient, standing alone, to deny an exemption.
Simply by inquiring whether the union-Connell agreement was entitled to the exemption,
the Court indicated a willingness to extend the nonstatutory exemption to all unionemployer agreements. The limitation on this extension would be an agreement creating a
market restraint of the magnitude created by the union-Connell agreement. See 421 U.S.

at 625-26.
105. Id. at 623.
106. Id. at 623 & n.l. See generally Comment, Antitrust Law: Most FavoredNation
Clause and Labor's Antitrust Exemption, 19 J. PuB. L. 399 (1970).
107. 421 U.S. at 623-24.
108. Id. at 624.
109. Id. at 625-26.
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well as actual anticompetitive effects. 0 Accordingly, the Court was
willing to consider whether the subject agreement was entitled to the
nonstatutory exemption even though the record was devoid of facts
indicating that the union was using or might use the agreement to control
market access."' This is significant to the extent that Justice White's test
focused more on the union's interest and its legitimacy than on the means
chosen to that end. The conclusion is inescapable that the Court will strip
a union of its exemption if an agreement may potentially restrain competition in ways that do not follow naturally from elimination of competition
over labor conditions.
The Court's willingness to pave new legal ground was not limited to
the antitrust issue but extended, in a rather conclusory fashion, to the
question of congressional intent with regard to the section 8(e) issue.12
The union had argued under the construction industry proviso to section
8(e) that the agreement could not be violative of the antitrust laws absent
Allen Bradley collusion or Pennington conspiracy and predatory intent.
Indeed, the literal requirements of the proviso were evident: the parties
were an employer and a labor organization engaged in the subcontracting
of work at the site of construction. Eschewing a literal reading, the
majority, on what at best was ambiguous legislative history, 1 3 asserted
that Congress could not have meant the proviso to protect an agreement
concluded outside the context of a collective bargaining relationship. 14
The precise question of whether Congress intended the construction
industry proviso to apply to signatory agreements concluded outside the
context of a collective bargaining relationship had not been previously
considered by any court or the NLRB."15 However, the NLRB's General
110. Id. at 623-25.
111. Id.at 624-25.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
113. See text accompanying notes 144-45 infra.
114. 421 U.S. at 633. The majority summarized its position by declaring that Congress
could not have intended to leave open the type of agreement sought by the union. Id. This
conclusion regarding congressional intent represents an about face from the Court's
position in Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93 (1958). In Sand Door, the Court
had spotted a glaring loophole in the secondary boycott provisions but refused to fill it
without specific legislative guidance.
115. The Board, however, appeared to be aware of the problem. For instance, in
Northeastern Indiana Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Centelivre Village Apartments),
148 N.L.R.B. 854, 57 L.R.R.M. 1081, enf't denied on other grounds, 352 F.2d 696 (D.C.

Cir. 1964), the general contractor did not have a collective bargaining relationship with the
union seeking an agreement that he would subcontract only signatories of the agreement.
The Board nevertheless assumed that the proviso applied to the agreement since neither
party disputed the point. 148 N.L.R.B. at 856 n. 11,57 L.R.R.M. at 1082 n.I I. In Church's
Fried Chicken, 183 N.L.R.B. 1032, 74 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1970), the question before the
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Counsel appeared to address the very issue raised in Connell116 and
determined that a collective bargaining relationship was not a prerequisite for proviso protection even though "the contractor did not employ
employees of the craft represented by the union ...

.'"I' The General

Counsel, therefore, declined to issue complaints in cases raising that
8
issue. 1
The majority added a caveat to the collective bargaining requirement
by extending the proviso's possible protection to common-situs relationships on particular jobsites. 119 In summarizing the elements necessary
for proviso protection, the majority declared: "[T]hat . . . which is

outside the context of a collective-bargaining relationship and not restricted to a particular job site . . . , may be the basis of a federal
antitrust suit."120 The majority therefore left unclear whether a signatory

clause would have to be limited to a particular jobsite, thus requiring the
clause to be negotiated site-by-site. In a naked assertion of economic
policy, the majority declared that if the proviso were interpreted to
authorize subcontracting agreements with stranger general contractors,
unions would have an almost unlimited organizational weapon with
12
which to coerce nonunion subcontractors. 1
Board was whether it was unlawful under § 8(b)(4) for a union to require an employer to
sign a subcontracting agreement violative of § 8(e). No § 8(e) violation was found, even
though Church had no collective bargaining relationship with the union.
116. The General Counsel stated the issue as follows:
A number of cases have raised the issue of whether a construction union violates
sections 8(b)(4)(A) and/or 8(e) when it seeks or obtains by picketing an otherwise
valid on-site construction subcontracting clause under the 8(e) proviso from a
contractor who does not himself employ employees of the craft represented by
that union.
NLRB General Counsel Memorandum, Release No. R-1343 at I (July 2, 1974), reprintedin
LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 298, 298 (1974) [hereinafter LAB. YEARBOOK].
117. Id. at 298, 306. The issue framed by the General Counsel was narrower than the
one presented in Connell and addressed only the situation in which the general contractor
has no employees represented by the particular craft union. Implicit in that issue was an
understanding that the general contractor could have had unionized employees. In
Connell, however, the contractor's employees were nonunion and thus the craft-union
distinction would not have applied.
118. See, e.g., Plumbers Local 100 (Hagler Constr. Co.), N.L.R.B. Case No. 16-CC447 (1975). This refusal to issue complaints of this nature has been called a "clear case of
administrative abuse of power." See Janofsky & Peterson, The Exercise of Unreviewed
Administrative Discretion to Reverse the U.S. Supreme Court:PonsfordBrothers, 25 LAB.
L.J. 729, 735 (1974).
119. 421 U.S. at 633.
120. Id. at 635.
121. Id. at 631. The Court found it "highly improbable" that Congress would have
intended to grant unions such economic power, since "[o]ne of the major aims of the 1959
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The dissent, led by Justice Stewart, sidestepped the proviso question
by pointing to compelling evidence of congressional intent that labor
remedies be exclusive for any injury caused by union secondary activities and agreements. 122 This interpretation, Justice Stewart noted,
was clearly warranted by the pertinent legislative history which indicated
that on three prior occasions Congress had rejected proposals which
would have extended antitrust remedies to cover unlawful secondary
activities by unions. 123 The original House version of the Taft-Hartley
Act would have subjected unions to antitrust liability, 24 but was rejected
in favor of Senator Taft's proposal 125 providing compensatory damages
for injured parties. 2 6 Senator Griffin declared that "[t]here is no antitrust law provision in [the Landrum-Griff in amendments]." 27 Congress,
in effect, evinced a clear intent to preclude antitrust liability for all
secondary activities' 28 and toprovide an effective private damages remeAct was to limit 'top-down' organizing. . ." Id. at 632. The congressional proponents of
the common-situs bill, S. 1479 & H.R. 5900, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1976), enacted by
Congress but vetoed by the President, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 16 (Jan. 5, 1976),
expressly disagreed with the majority's interpretation. See S. REP. No. 438, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 12 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 371,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975). The passage of the
common-situs legislation would not have had any appreciable effect on a Connell-type
agreement since the union did not represent any of the construction site employees.
122. 421 U.S. at 640-46. Justice Stewart did note that "[i]f, contrary to the Court's
conclusion, . . . Congress intended what it said in the proviso to section 8(e), then the
subcontracting agreement is valid..."; that picketing to obtain it would be lawful; and
that "[i]t would seem necessarily to follow that conduct specifically authorized by
Congress. . . could not by itself be the basis for federal antitrust liability." Id. at 648 n.8.
123. Id. at 639.
124. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. § 301 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 92-94 (1948), [hereinafter
cited as 1947 LEGIS. HIST.]; see 421 U.S. at 640-46.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970).
126. Congress also amended § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970), to provide a private right of
action for violations of § 8(e). Section 303 was amended to incorporate by reference the
new § 8(b)(4)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1970), which makes union pressure to obtain
agreements in violation of § 8(e) an unfair labor practice. If the union's agreement was not
within the § 8(e) proviso, its picketing to secure that agreement was a violation of
§ 8(b)(4)(A), and therefore remediable under § 303. 421 U.S. at 648 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE ACT, 1959, at 1472 [hereinafter cited as 1959 LEGIS. HIST.].
127. 105 CONG. REC. 15535 (1959). During House consideration of the Landrum-Griffin
Act, specific amendments for extending antitrust liability to labor unions were rejected.
See 421 U.S. at 650-53.
128. Proposals to impose antitrust sanctions were made by Senator McClellan and by
Congressmen Hoffman and Alger. See 1959 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 126, at 1100, 148283, 1568-71, 1685, 1705-08. Congressman Griffin, architect of the bill ultimately adopted,
emphasized that his bill was a minimum compromise and contained no antitrust provision.
See id. at 1571-72.
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dy for those activities. 129 The Court's extension of antitrust liability to
secondary agreements' 30 renders labor remedies superfluous since employers presumably will seek treble damage recovery under the antitrust
laws. 3
The Court's application of antitrust remedies to section 8(e) violations
indicates that it considered the labor remedies inadequate. This approach
ignores the fact that Congress amended section 8(b)(4)(A) to make it an
unfair labor practice for a union to force an employer to enter into an
agreement violative of section 8(e).13 2 Therefore, parties injured by the
implementation or enforcement of the agreement could recover all actual
damages under section 303. 133 The Court also left open the possibility of
injunctive relief under the Sherman Act.' 34 This possibility is clearly
unnecessary because section 10(1) of the NLRA 135 empowers the Board
to hold an expedited proceeding and petition for injunctive relief in cases
36
involving secondary activity.1
V.

NARROWING THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY PROVISO

In analyzing the union's statutory exemption claims, the Court first
considered whether the agreement was protected by the construction
industry proviso of section 8(e) of the Landrum-Griffin Act. 37 It found
38
that the agreement fell within the letter but not the spirit of that law.1
Although by its terms the proviso protects all agreements between unions and employers concerning work to be done at the jobsite, the Court
noted that Congress had also intended to outlaw "top-down" organizing
129. The Connell majority, however, sharply contrasted § 8(b)(4) and § 8(e). The
majority suggested that if Connell had not signed the agreement, the labor laws would
have provided the exclusive remedies, but, in this instance, the mere signing by Connell
removed the union's antitrust immunity. It is doubtful that Congress intended to place
such a powerful weapon in the hands of employers.
130. 421 U.S. at 634.
131. See Monaghan, supra note 5, at 239.
132. See note 126 supra.

133. Enforcement of such an agreement would be violative of § 8(b)(4)(B) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1970). The NLRA does not, however, allow an injured
party to recover damages suffered as a result of an unlawful agreement into which the
employer voluntarily entered. Nevertheless, normal Board remedies remain. See text
accompanying note 135 infra.
134. 421 U.S. at 637 n.19.
135. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970).
136. Until the Court resolves this issue, lower courts are likely to find a Connell-type

situation within the Norris-LaGuardia definition of a "labor dispute," thus prohibiting an
injunction. See Utilities Serv. Eng'r, Inc. v. Colorado Constr. & Trades Council, 549 F.2d
173, 176 (10th Cir. 1977).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
138. 421 U.S. at 628.
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campaigns of the type used by Local 100 and could not have included
such a "glaring loophole" in its general ban on this tactic.13 9
The Court found that the hot-cargo agreement between the union and
Connell could not receive the protection of section 8(e) because
Congress had meant to limit that section's applicability to situations in
which a collective bargaining relationship existed. 140 The purpose of the
statute, the Court pointed out, was to reduce the possibility of jobsite
friction which often would occur when union and nonunion men work
side by side. In Connell, however, the union had used the hot-cargo
agreement for the entirely different purpose of organizing nonunion
subcontractors and eliminating job and wage competition in the subcontracting market. Therefore, the agreement could not claim the protection
of the construction industry proviso and thus violated section 8(e).1 41 In
concluding that the proviso should be narrowly construed, the Court
further reasoned that in contrast to the full exemption given employees
by the garment industry proviso to section 8(e), 142 the exemption created
43
by the construction industry proviso was far more limited.
The Court's conclusion that proviso protection required a collective
bargaining relationship does not appear to be supported by the legislative
history of the construction industry proviso. Senator John F. Kennedy,
the floor manager of the bill in the Senate, discussed at length the effects
the proviso would have on labor relations in the construction industry. 144
Nowhere did he mention either the collective bargaining or particular
jobsite requirements set by the Connell Court. The House Conference
139. Id. at 633.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 633-35. Opinions by both the NLRB and the various circuit courts have also
concluded that § 8(e) applies to all hot-cargo agreements concerning jobsite work done in
the construction industry. See, e.g., Suburban Tile Center v. Rockford Bldg. Trades
Council, 354 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966); Los Angeles Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council (B & J Inv. Co.), 214 N.L.R.B. 562, 563, 87 L.R.R.M. 1424,
1426 (1974).
142. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970). See Danielson v. Joint Bd., ILGWU, 494 F.2d 1230,
1233-39 (2d Cir. 1974).
143. 421 U.S. at 628-30.
144. Senator Kennedy explained the proviso as follows:
The first proviso . . . is intended to preserve the present state of the law with
respect to picketing at the site of a construction project and with respect to the
validity of agreements relating to the contracting of work to be done at the site of
a construction project. . ..
Agreements by which a contractor in the construction industry promises not to
subcontract work on a construction site to a nonunion contractor appear to be
legal today. They will not be unlawful under § 8(e). 105 CONG. REC. 17900 (1959),
reprinted in 1959 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 126, at 1439.
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Report discussing the proviso also did not support the Court's view. 145
However, the Court's only reference to the statements of Senator Kennedy and the House Conferees was in a footnote.'4
The Connell Court's limitation of proviso protection to collective
bargaining relationships appears to be contrary to congressional intent of
preventing jobsite friction. Certain general contractors in the construction industry will invariably subcontract an entire job so that none of its
employees will be on a particular jobsite. The subcontractor may, however, have union employees who would be unwilling to work alongside
nonunion workers. The representative of the subcontractor's union employees would be unable, under the collective bargaining restriction, to
obtain a restrictive subcontracting clause preventing subcontracting to
nonunion firms. A clear result of this situation would be work disruption
arising from jobsite friction. The Court may have envisioned this situation when it suggested that the proviso might extend not only to agreements "in the context of [a] collective-bargaining relationship" but
"possibly to common-situs relationships on particular jobsites as
well. ,147
The Court's handling of the proviso issue also overlooked the District
of Columbia Circuit's pronouncement in DallasBuilding & Construction
Trades Council v. NLRB, 148 that the type of organizational picketing 1in
49
which Local 100 engaged would have been lawful under section 8(b)(7)
of the NLRA had the agreement been "limited to the type of work which
is never performed by the general contractor's own employees."1 50 The
court of appeals recognized that section 8(e) and section 8(b)(7) are
aimed at "wholly different problems"' 15' and thus undercut the Connell
145. The Report was stated in similarly inclusive terms:
The committee of conference does not intend that this proviso should be
construed so as to change the present state of the law with respect to the validity
of this specific type of agreement . . . . To the extent that such agreements are
legal today under section 8(b)(4) . . ., the proviso would prevent such legality

from being affected by section 8(e).
H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1959), reprintedin [1959] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2503, 2511; 1947 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 124, at 943.
146. 421 U.S. at 629 n.8.
147. Id. at 633. It should be noted that the former General Counsel took this position in
a case raising the same issue and refused to issue a complaint thereon. See BCTC of
Orange County (Compath), Case No. 21-CC-1678 (Aug. 1975).
148. 396 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
149. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1970). Section 8(b)(7) is aimed at preventing organizational
or recognitional picketing by an uncertified union and prohibits picketing carried on for
more than thirty days without the filing of a representation petition under § 9(c), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c) (1970).
150. 396 F.2d at 682 n.8.
151. Id. at 682.
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Court's fear that the union's proviso arguments would undermine section
8(b)(7)'s prohibition of "top-down organizing. "152
The new requirements set forth by the Court for proviso protection are
ostensibly aimed at preventing "top-down organizing" by labor organizations. I" Yet those same requirements permit a degree of such organizing in situations in which the general contractor has unionized employees
and the negotiated subcontracting agreement provides subcontracting
only to firms having a collective bargaining agreement with that particular union. Under the Court's requirements, the agreement is lawful as
executed within a collective-bargaining relationship and limited to a
common-situs relationship on a particular jobsite. The unhealthy aspect
of the agreement, in light of the "top-down organizing" prohibition, is
that it encourages subcontracting firms, whether union or nonunion, to
sign collective bargaining agreements with a particular union in order to
obtain a subcontracting award. This type of agreement not only encourages "top-down organizing,' ' 54 but also inhibits the exercise of employ155
ees' section 7 rights to choose their bargaining representative.
VI.

STRIKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN ANTITRUST AND LABOR:

PER SE OR RULE OF REASON APPROACH

A.

Application of Antitrust Rules to Union-Employer Agreements

The Sherman Act contains no standards to guide its application. The
difficult task of developing rules to determine what conduct it renders
illegal has invariably been thrust upon the courts. After an initial, literal
application of the Act to union activities, 56 the Supreme Court developed the "rule of reason": The Sherman Act embraced only acts,
contracts, agreements, or combinations that operated to the prejudice of
the public interest by unduly restricting competition, obstructing
157
commerce, or injuriously restraining trade.
152. 421 U.S. at 632-33.
153. See note 139 & accompanying text supra.
154. Such an agreement strongly implies that the signatory union's aim is to encourage
collective bargaining recognition by subcontracting firms and, hence, effect "top-down
organizing."
155. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
156. The Act applied to and pronounced illegal every contract or combination in
restraint to trade among the several states. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,
166 U.S. 290, 312, 326-29 (1897). See text accompanying notes 7-15 supra.
157. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 175-80 (1911). See generally Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 23 (1964) (the author
concludes that both the rule of reason and the per se rule are mere procedural devices and
should not be allowed to overshadow the true issue of antitrust regulation which is one of
social policy).
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Whether a given practice or agreement constituted an unreasonable
restraint of trade required both a judicial consideration of the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint was applied and an investigation into the nature and effect of the restraint, its history, and the goal
sought to be achieved by imposing it. This determination thus required
the evaluation of a multitude of facts for each case. In response to this
evidentiary problem, courts have developed the rule of per se illegality,
under which certain agreements or practices are presumed to be unreasonable without inquiry into the factual circumstances of each
case.158 Among the practices and agreements held to be illegal per se,
"because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue,"' 59 are price fixing, 16 division of markets, 16 1 group

boycotts,

62

competitor exclusion,

63

and tying arrangements.164

As already indicated, the existence of a combination or conspiracy to
restrain a particular market is difficult to prove and courts therefore have
developed evidentiary rules that permit their existence to be inferred
from "things actually done.' 1 65 An example of this approach is the
doctrine of "conscious parallelism" announced in InterstateCircuit,Inc.

v. United States:'66 "Acceptance by competitors, without previous
agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is
sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman

Act."1 67
158. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210-18 (1940).
The per se rule is applied to those restraints which, over a period of time, have been found
inimical to a competitive system. This rule not only aids in predicting what conduct is
permissible but also acts as a deterrent in that no reason or explanation will excuse or
justify conduct which is subject to the rule. The application of such a standard frees the
court of the burden of extensive factfinding analysis and of the different economic
examinations inherent in the application of the rule of reason. See Bork, The Rule of
Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L. J.
373, 380-84 (1966). See generally United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 60612 & n.10 (1972).
159. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
160. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210-18 (1940).
161. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 295-96 (1898), aff'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
162. See Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941).
163. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
164. See id.at 398.
165. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612
(1914).
166. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
167. Id.at 227.
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Finally, in determining whether a particular restraint is unlawful, the
defendant's motive, intent, or purpose is generally irrelevant under the
rule of reason' 68 and absolutely immaterial when a per se violation is
charged. Proof of bad purpose may condemn an otherwise reasonable
restraint, but in all other cases the requisite intent is presumed from the
69
existence of unlawful effects.'
These rules were designed to facilitate the enforcement of a national
antitrust policy directed toward the elimination of anticompetitive arrangements among business entities and were developed in cases that
involved no countervailing national policy. The establishment of a national labor policy raises the question whether traditional antitrust rules
should be applied to test the lawfulness of union-employer agreements.
At the very least, it calls into question the efficacy of applying the per se
rule to such agreements.
The national labor policy, embodied in the National Labor Relations
Act, 170 is directed toward the achievement of industrial peace through
collective bargaining. To maintain industrial peace, labor policy requires
the negotiation of agreements between labor and management. As a
natural consequence of these agreements, competition is generally less17 1
ened not only in the labor market but the product market as well.
Because antitrust policy is concerned with maintaining competition, the
rules developed pursuant thereto are extremely important for the
continued vitality of union-employer negotiation and agreement. The
structure and application of a rule, in effect, will determine whether a
particular union-employer agreement is lawful. In that regard, a rule of
reason standard or modification thereof is appropriate in judging the
legality of these agreements. Any stricter standard would do immeasur72
able harm to the system of collective bargaining. 1
168. See Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912).
169. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,621-23 (1953).
170. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
171. Should a union organize all the firms in a particular industry, the adoption of
uniform labor standards would result in the elimination of competition within the labor
market. Any price competition in the product market based on differences in labor costs
would also be eliminated.
172. The rule of reason is particularly appropriate since it protects those contracts and
combinations which are basic to our economic system by allowing an examination of all
their effects so that they will not be struck down without an enlightened balance of their
relative benefits and evils. See generally Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,
238 (1918). For a discussion of the rule of reason, see Bork, The Rule of Reason and the
Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 1), 74 YALE L. J. 775, 781-847
(1965).
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A related point involves a determination by the National Labor Relations Board on particular practices, clauses, or agreements. In cases in
which the Board has determined that a particular practice or agreement is
lawful under the NLRA, two things should occur in a later antitrust
proceeding: A rule of reason approach should apply; and antitrust liability should not attach unless there is a Pennington-typepredatory purpose
and substantial restraint on the product market.
First, a positive Board determination would indicate that the matter is
protected or lawful under the NLRA. Thus the parties believed they
were acting lawfully. Second, if the preceding approach is not utilized,
the parties are faced with a negotiating dilemma. For instance, if the
Board held that a proposed bargaining topic was a mandatory one, 73 but
agreement upon that subject would raise the possibility of an antitrust
violation, a negotiating party faces several choices. If he refuses to
bargain, he risks committing an unfair labor practice, since the NLRB
cannot decide whether the antitrust laws apply to such an agreement. If
he bargains but refuses to agree, he risks a strike or lockout that cannot
be enjoined. 7 4 And, of course, if he signs the agreement, he risks
antitrust liability.
The approach advocated above does not rest on exempting mandatory
subjects of bargaining from antitrust scrutiny. This would unnecessarily
provide negotiating parties with an easy avenue to circumvent the antitrust laws. Furthermore, the Board might eventually be forced into the
role of considering the antitrust implications of particular bargaining
subjects, a role for which the Board is untrained.
B.

Connell: Rule of Reason Approach

The Connell Court never directly addressed the question of whether a
rule of reason approach would be appropriate to the facts of that case. Its
opinion did indicate, in several ways, that the rule of reason approach
was preferred over a per se standard. 175 The per se rule was applicable, if
at all, only to the question of whether the union had forfeited its exemption, not whether it had committed a substantive violation under the
173. See-generally Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964).
In general, if a proposal concerns wages, hours, and working conditions, it is a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Sections 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), and 8(d) require employers and employees
to bargain over mandatory subjects. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1970). See NLRB
v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
174. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970), drastically limits the
power of federal courts to issue injunctions in both primary and secondary labor disputes.
175. See text accompanying notes 189-93 infra.
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antitrust laws. The question of whether a substantive violation had been
176
committed was remanded to the district court for determination.
The Court placed primary reliance upon Justice White's opinions in
Pennington and Jewel Tea. In Pennington, the Court, per Justice White,
found the union's conduct, in combining with a nonlabor group, within
the Hutcheson-Allen Bradley principle and thus not exempt from the
antitrust laws. Employing a rule of reason balancing test, Justice White
asserted that the national labor policies offered no protection for unionemployer agreements within a single "bargaining unit" that attempted to
establish standards for other units. Thus the UMW agreement was not
entitled to an exemption. 177 Nonexemption, however, was not to be
equated with a substantive violation of the antitrust laws. Thus a per se
violation would not attach upon loss of exemptive status but would
require the establishment of a conspiracy with "predatory intent." Indeed, Justice Douglas understood the Court to require a finding of a joint
purpose of union and large owners to destroy certain of their competitors
to establish an antitrust violation. 78 For example, an industry-wide
agreement with a wage scale exceeding the ability of some operators to
pay would be prima facie evidence of such illegal intention.
In Jewel Tea, Justice White clarified the Pennington Court's suggestion that the question of labor's exemption is considered separate from
whether a substantive violation of the antitrust laws has been committed. 179 In the absence of a Pennington-type conspiracy, Justice White
indicated that the Court would engage in a rule of reason balancing
approach to determine whether the union was entitled to an exemption. 180 The crucial determinant was not the subject matter of the agreement, but rather its relative impact on the product market weighed
against the interests of union members.' 8 ' However, a finding of not
"intimately related" would not automatically give rise to a substantive
violation of the antitrust laws.182 A further determination would have to
176. 421 U.S. at 637; see note 93 supra.
177.

381 U.S. at 666.

178. Id. at 672-75 (Douglas, J., concurring).
179. Justice White stated that "the issue before us is not the broad substantive one of a
violation of the antitrust laws . . . but whether the agreement is immune from attack by
reason of the labor exemption from the antitrust laws." 381 U.S. at 688-89.
180. Id. at 691.
181. Id. at 690 n.5.
182. Justice White noted that "[w]hether there would be a violation of §§ I and 2 would
then depend on whether the elements of a conspiracy in restraint of trade or an attempt to
monopolize had been proved." Id. at 693. It could be argued that a competitive restraint
deemed sufficient to overrule labor's exemption would most likely be held an antitrust
violation. See Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemption After Pennington and Jewel Tea, 66

COLUM. L. REV. 742, 757-59 (1966).
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be made that the restraint was unreasonable.18 3 In Jewel Tea, that determination was properly made by the lower court, since the reasonableness
of an operating-hours restraint was supported by the record.184 Had there
been no relationship between the contract restriction and the workload
of the butchers, the contract would fall outside the labor exemption and
be subjected to the usual scrutiny, including the rule of reason, to
85
determine whether it constituted a substantive antitrust violation.
Reading Pennington and Jewel Tea together, two principles can be
gleaned: First, if a union-employer conspiracy exists with a predatory
intent, the Court will, in all likelihood, impose a per se rule to deny an
exemption. 86 Second, if a conspiracy is not alleged, or exists without a
predatory intent, the Court will remand for a full rule of reason analy88
sis, 87 of the alleged anticompetitive activity.
While the Connell Court did not suggest a significant alternative approach to that presented in Pennington and Jewel Tea, it did offer some
modifications. The Court noted the absence of any evidence of a conspiracy with the members of the multiemployer bargaining group. 89
Thus, the Allen Bradley-Pennington situation was not present. But the
Court was not above scrutinizing Local 100's agreement with the multiemployer bargaining unit to determine the effect of the agreement
between Connell and Local 100 on the product market. In the Court's
183. 381 U.S. at 693 & n.6.
184. Id. at 694-97.
185. Id. at 692-93.
186. Both Allen Bradley and Hutcheson support this conclusion: Hutcheson granted a
broad per se exemption to unions acting in their self interest and not combining with a
nonlabor group. Allen Bradley, on the other hand, indicated that the Court would have
little trouble finding an antitrust violation if a conspiracy is found.
187. This would include an investigation into whether the particular restraint on the
product market was unreasonable.
188. Justice White stated that a union "forfeits" its exemption when it is "clearly
shown" that it has agreed with one group of employers "to impose a certain wage scale on
other bargaining units." 381 U.S. at 665. Moreover, a union is "liable" if it becomes a
party to an employer conspiracy to eliminate competitors, even though the union's role is
limited to securing wages, hours, and working conditions from other employers. Id. at
665-66. Based upon the latter statement, the trial court, on remand, concluded that the
Court's opinion "teaches that it is necessary to find predatory intent to drive small coal
operators out of business in order to hold the employer and Union for a violation of the
Sherman Act." Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F. Supp. 815, 829 (E.D. Tenn. 1966), aff'd, 400
F.2d 806 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968).
Similarly, it has been held that a "most favored nation" clause in a collective bargaining
agreement does not per se violate the antitrust laws; it can be held to do so only if there is
proof of a predatory purpose on the part of the signatory union and employer to force
some other employer out of business. Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local
753, 422 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1970).
189. 421 U.S. at 625 n.2.
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view, Local 100 had used direct restraints on the commercial market to
achieve its concededly lawful organizational objective.'9° Furthermore,
the Court enunciated the rule that restraints on the business market
which do not follow naturally from the elimination of competition over
wages and working conditions will not be antitrust exempt. 9' Here the
Court, rather cryptically, reasserted the balancing element of Justice
White's Jewel Tea analysis, 92 but abandoned, for the most part, the
"intimate relation" test. 193 In its place, the Court asserted a per se type
analysis focusing on the existence of a collective bargaining relationship
and the magnitude of the restraint on the product market. The per se
analysis explains the Court's ambivalent attitude toward Local 100's
organizing goal inasmuch as intent or motive would be irrelevant under
94
this approach. 1
VII.

CONNELL: SIGNALLING

A

STIFFER STANDARD

The Connell Court's invalidation of the agreement between Connell
and the union rested on two findings. First, it emphasized that the
agreement had anticompetitive effects unrelated to wages, hours, and
working conditions. Second, the potential magnitude of the restraint was
such that the Court could not say whether the agreement would have
been protected had there been a collective bargaining relationship. 95
This statement suggests that the Court will look beyond the facade of a
collective bargaining relationship to the magnitude of the restraint on the
product market. This position is buttressed by the Court's analytic focus
190. Id. at 625.
191. Id.
192. The meaning of the phrase "follow naturally from the elimination of competition
over wages and working conditions" is never made clear by the Court. Certainly more
concrete guidance is given by Justice White's "intimately related" test or Hutcheson's
"self-interest" test and both are preferable. Consequently, the Connell test allows judges
greater freedom in applying their own notions of the proper balance of industrial power.
193. The balancing test appearing in Connell bears little, if any, resemblance to that
test purportedly applied in American Fed'n. of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
The Carroll Court applied Justice White's balancing test and held that a union had a
legitimate interest in imposing price lists and other direct restraints upon band leaders. The
divergent results produced by the legitimate union interest test in this case suggests that
the test is incapable of consistent and rational application through the judicial process. See
generally Di Cola, Labor Antitrust: Pennington,Jewel Tea, and Subsequent Meandering,
33 U. PiTr. L. REV. 705 (1972).
194. Since neither the district nor the circuit court had considered whether the agreement actually restrained trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act, and since the issue
was not fully briefed or argued before the Court, the case was remanded for a finding of
whether the agreement was an unreasonable restraint and therefore violated the Sherman
Act. 421 U.S. at 637.
195. Id. at 625-26.
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on the anticompetitive effects of the agreement in lieu of evidence of
subjective intent. 96 This statement also suggests that the Court will, on
the basis of the record before it, determine whether there is such a
potential for restraint in a particular market that the agreement or activity should not be entitled to an exemption.
The Court's "natural effects" test also places a different onus on the
parties claiming an exemption than existed under the "intimate relation"
test. Rather than simply having the burden of showing that its activities
or agreements are intimately related to wages, hours, and working conditions, the union must also demonstrate that the activities or agreements
do not have effects unrelated to the elimination of competition over
wages and working conditions. This difference becomes more pronounced if a court finds the agreement relates to wages and working conditions
but also has anticompetitive effects unrelated to their elimination. If that
is the case, under Connell, a court would focus on the magnitude of the
restraint.
Beyond the particular aspects of the construction industry, Connell
undoubtedly signals a stiffer standard for determining what is related to
and constitutes wages and working conditions within the nonstatutory
exemption.1 91 The Court can be expected to strictly scrutinize any
claimed exemption if there is a significant impact on the product market.
Certain agreements between a union and employer appear to be prime
candidates for future antitrust litigation. Within the construction industry, there is a good probability that a union signatory clause will be found
outside labor's antitrust exemption unless it is both part of a collective
bargaining agreement and is limited to a particular jobsite. But it is
possible that only one of the two requirements will have to be met due to
98
the proviso itself and the ambiguity of the Court's opinion in this area.,
Agreements outside the construction industry which, in all likelihood,
will be held outside the labor exemption include a "most favored nation"
clause' 99 and a union signatory agreement including subjects beyond
wages, hours, and working conditions. 2° ° A clause restricting sale of a
business only to an employer who will assume the collective bargaining
1M. Id. at 623.
197. See St. Antoine, supra note 5, at 630. The Court's reluctance to discern a
relationship between union organizing and wages and working conditions clearly supports
this point.
198. See text accompanying notes 119-21 supra.
199. See note 106 supra. Connell clearly indicated that such clauses were incompatible
with antitrust principles. See text accompanying notes 105-07 supra.
200. See text accompanying notes 106-07 supra & note 212 infra.
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agreement may be found outside the exemption. 2° 1 A "union standards"
clause will be held within the exemption unless it is coupled with an
20 2
unlawful purpose.
VIII.

THE PROBLEM OF LOWER COURT APPLICATION

For all the fervor generated by the Connell decision, very little in the
way of substantive antitrust litigation has transpired involving labor
activity. Two decisions since Connell have addressed the complex prob20 3
lem of interpreting and applying the Connell guidelines.
In Mackey v. NFL, an action had been brought by players challenging
the NFL's enforcement of the Rozelle Rule, which allowed the League
Commissioner to require clubs acquiring free agents to compensate the
free agent's former club. The district court held that the defendant's
enforcement of the Rozelle Rule constituted a concerted refusal to deal
and a group boycott, and was, therefore, a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. 2°0 On appeal, the NFL argued that it was entitled to a labor
exemption from the antitrust laws. The Eighth Circuit agreed that a
nonlabor group could assert and be entitled to a labor exemption, 20 5 but
201. Normally, a successor employer can be required to bargain with an incumbent
union. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Services, 406 U.S. 272 (1972). However, the
Board has held that the union may not insist upon a "successors and assigns" clause
requiring the current employer to sell the business only to a purchaser who will agree to be
bound by the then current contract and to hire the incumbent work force. National
Maritime Union (Commerce Tankers Corp.), 196 N.L.R.B. 1100, enforced, 486 F.2d 907
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974). See also LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 2%, 296-

97 (1974). This type of clause could result in the union's loss of its exemption. See notes
211-17 & accompanying text infra.
202. A union standards clause generally provides that subcontracted employers must
be willing to comply with the prevailing union wages and working conditions. Such a
clause has the effect of preserving the bargaining unit's interest in maintaining wages and
working conditions and not just the union's interest in preserving its existence. See note
212 infra.
203. Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 553 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 400 (1977); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed per stipulation, No. 76-932 (U.S. Sept. 12, 1977). A tangential question in
Commerce Tankers was whether an unlawful § 8(e) clause's inclusion in a lawful collective bargaining agreement might save it from antitrust scrutiny. 553 F.2d at 801-02. In
Mackey the court was faced with an employer group claiming a nonstatutory exemption
because of the alleged inclusion of the specific clause (Rozelle Rule) in a collective
bargaining agreement.
204. 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1007 (D. Minn. 1975). See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (an agreement constituting a group boycott is illegal per
se under § I of the Sherman Act).
205. 543 F.2d at 612. "Since the basis of the nonstatutory exemption is the national
policy favoring collective bargaining, and since the exemption extends to agreements, the
benefits of the exemption logically extend to both parties of the agreement." Id.
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ruled that the exemption applied only to a collective bargaining agree26
ment clause that was the product of bona fide arm's length bargaining. 0
Further, the unusual circumstances of this case did not compel the use of
a per se approach. 207 Also, from a practical standpoint, a per se analysis
was unnecessary since the district court had already engaged in a lengthy
20
inquiry into the operation of the industry in question. 1
The Mackey decision is noteworthy in underscoring the importance of
arm's length bargaining. Certainly Pennington emphasized that a collective bargaining agreement, at least with a multiemployer group, would
not grant immunity in and of itself and Connell did not indicate otherwise. 209 Moreover, Mackey involved an employer group that was seeking
a nonstatutory exemption and the suit had been brought by the labor
group that would have been the source of the exemption. The Mackey
court's perusal of Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Connell reveals that courts
must look beyond the facade of a collective bargaining agreement and
into both the nature of the bargaining relationship and the magnitude of
the restraint on the product market. Of equal importance is the court's
understanding that the Supreme Court's triad of labor-antitrust decisions
206. Id. at 614. The court gleaned certain principles from prior Supreme Court decisions concerning the proper accommodation of labor and antitrust.
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may potentially be given
pre-eminence over the antitrust laws where the restraint on trade primarily affects
only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship. [Citing Connell, 421
U.S. at 625-26]. Second, federal labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail
only where the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining. [Citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 697]. Finally, the policy
favoring collective bargaining is furthered to the degree necessary to override the
antitrust laws only where the agreement sought to be exempted is the product of
bona fide arm's length bargaining. [Citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 697].
543 F.2d at 614 (footnotes & citations omitted).
The Court found that the Rozelle Rule was a mandatory subject of bargaining because it
restricted a player's ability to move from one team to another and depressed wages. It
was, however, not the product of arm's length bargaining but had been foisted on the
union by the NFL. Id. at 615-16.
207. Id. at 619. The court noted that the line of per se cases generally concerned
agreements between business competitors in the traditional sense. In this case, the NFL
assumed some of the characteristics of a joint venture in that each member has a stake in
the success of the other teams. Moreover, the alleged restraint did not completely
eliminate competition for players' services. Id.
208. Id. at 619-20. One of the underpinnings of the per se analysis is the avoidance of
lengthy and burdensome inquiries into the operation of an industry. Thus, the instant case
lacked much of the basis for the application of the per se doctrine.
209. The Court in Connell merely left open the question of whether a collective
bargaining agreement could immunize an allegedly unlawful clause stating that, "[tjhere
can be no argument in this case, whatever its force in other contexts, that a restraint of
this magnitude might be entitled to an antitrust exemption if it were included in a
lawful collective-bargaining agreement." 421 U.S. at 625-26.
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indicated that a rule of reason approach is appropriate in cases in which
the questionable clause is contained in an agreement between a union
210
and a multiemployer group.
In Commerce Tankers Corp. v. NationalMaritime Union,2 1' the Second Circuit examined a restrictive clause contained in a lawful collective
bargaining agreement developed through arm's length bargaining. To
make matters more difficult, the NLRB had already determined that the
National Maritime Union's (NMU) enforcement of a restraint-on-transfer clause in the collective bargaining agreement with Commerce violated
section 8(e) of the NLRA and the Second Circuit had granted enforcement of the Board's order. 212 In this action, Commerce argued that the
restraint-on-transfer clause would not be exempt from the antitrust laws
under the standards established by Connell and that the agreement
constituted a per se illegal group boycott under section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 21 3 The district court had already determined that the clause was not
the result of a conspiracy between NMU and the large shipping
companies to enhance their competitive position. 2 14 The court of appeals
correctly realized that this finding did not preclude a full examination of
the group boycott claim. Citing Connell for support, 215 the court noted
210. In Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), the district court found
that the employers' association could not claim the labor exemption to the antitrust laws
since the restrictive player draft was not part of a lawful collective bargaining agreement
at the time the plaintiff signed. Moreover, a scheme advantageous to employers cannot
come within the labor exemption until it becomes part of a collective bargaining agreement
negotiated by the union in its own self-interest. Id. at 742. The court found that the player
draft had no redeeming characteristics and thus was a per se violation of the antitrust laws
as a group boycott and refusal to deal.
211. 553 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1977).
212. 486 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974). The court found
convincing the Board's distinction between a union signatory clause and union standards
clause. The former had the effect of preserving the union's interest whereas the latter
preserved the bargaining unit's interest in maintaining wages and working conditions.
Buttressing the court's conclusion was the evidence of the practice of NMU to strip a
vessel of its seamen whenever it is sold and to have those jobs available only through its
hiring hall. Id. at 913-14. Thus the beneficiaries of the union's clause would not be the
members employed on the vessel but the membership as a whole.
213. 553 F.2d at 801.
214. 411 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd in part & rev'd inpart, 553 F.2d 793 (2d
Cir. 1977).
215. 553 F.2d at 802. The court noted that in Connell, "[t]here was no evidence that
Local 100's organizing campaign was connected with any agreement with members of the
multiemployer bargaining unit .... ." Id. at 802 n.10 (quoting Connell, 421 U.S. at 625
n.2). But the Supreme Court nonetheless considered the multiemployer bargaining agreement relevant in determining the effect that the agreement would have on the business
market. 421 U.S. at 623. Thus the lack of a conspiracy element clearly did not end further
inquiry into the group boycott claim. It did dispense with any notion of a per se approach.
Without the establishment of a Pennington-typeconspiracy with predatory intent, Connell
indicates that a remand for a full rule of reason inquiry is appropriate.
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that on remand the district court would have to evaluate the agreement
between NMU and the shipping companies for its effect on the relevant
product market.2" 6 The court viewed Jewel Tea as requiring a full scale
rule of reason inquiry in every instance in which a nonexempt labor
activity is alleged to violate the anti-trust laws.2 17
The important question of whether the inclusion of the clause in a
lawful collective bargaining agreement sheltered NMU because of the
218
federal policy favoring collective bargaining was left unanswered.
Instead, the court predicated union liability on the existence of a "direct
restraint on the business market . . .that would not follow naturally
upon the elimination of competition over wages and working conditions." 219 This is troublesome since the Supreme Court in Connell faced
a restrictive subcontracting agreement not contained in a lawful collective bargaining agreement. Local 100 had no intention of organizing or
representing Connell's employees, and its efforts were directed at securing jobs for its members who would be newcomers to the construction
site. In Commerce, NMU represented employees presently on the ship in
question, and negotiated at arm's length over that which, in essence, was
a mandatory subject of bargaining with the direct employer. Additionally, the union acted pursuant to its own self-interest and not in complicity
with a nonlabor group. Disregarding these distinguishing factors, the
court focused instead on the Connell Court's ambiguous "natural effects" test, 220 which invariably gives wider discretion to courts in determining which activity is subject to the antitrust laws. The test's application in this case left NMU liable since the restraint-on-transfer clause
went to the union's survival and had little, if any, tangible effect on
wages or working conditions, because a sister union would have repre221
sented any new crew a purchaser would have obtained.
The Mackey and Commerce opinions indicate that Connell will not be
applied in isolation but as merely one more piece in a far larger mosaic
formed by Allen Bradley, Pennington, and Jewel Tea. Connell, however
threatens to obscure those decisions if lower courts focus on its "natural
216., 553 F.2d at 802.
217. Id. at 802 & n.8 (quoting Handler, Labor and Antitrust: A Bit of History, 40
ANTITRUST L.J. 233, 239-40 (1971)). With that the court brushed aside Commerce's argument that a determination that the clause violated § 8(e) also determined the antitrust
issue.
218. 553 F.2d at 801-02. The Court apparently felt that the federal policy regarding
collective bargaining did not protect the agreement since it remanded to determine
whether there was a direct restraint on the product market. Id. at 802.
219. Id. at 801 (quoting Connell, 421 U.S. at 625).
220. See text accompanying notes 103-04 supra.
221. See 553 F.2d at 796-97.
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effects" test and overlook the narrow context of its underlying facts.
While commentators have suggested that Connell's unusual circumstances will invariably limit its future applicability, 222 it is possible that
lower courts may interpret Connell as signaling a stiffer standard for
determining wages and working conditions within the nonstatutory antitrust exemption of Jewel Tea. This view is evident in Commerce and
suggests a broad reading of Connell. Certainly, it suggests a close exami223
nation of agreements the Board has declared violative of section 8(e).
IX.

CONNELL: CHANGING THE COURSE OF BOARD LAW

The Supreme Court's collateral disposition of the section 8(e) proviso
issue in Connell represented a significant departure from the Board's
development of the proviso. In several pre-Connell cases, which did not
directly raise a Connell-type issue, the Board had found similar subcontracting agreements to be within the proviso. 224 The General Counsel had
previously issued a memorandum on the point 225 and had administratively dismissed charges which were based, at least in part, on legal arguments advanced in Connell.226 Additionally, the General Counsel submitted an amicus curiae brief seeking affirmance of the lower court
decision without reaching the question of whether the clause violated
section 8(e), since he argued that the clause qualified for the exemption
and thus jurisdiction rested with the Board.22
As recognized by the Connell Court, the primary purpose of the
section 8(e) proviso was to alleviate the frictions that may arise when
union men work continuously alongside nonunion men on the same
222. See St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L.
REV. 603, 628 (1976); Comment, Labor's Antitrust Immunity After Connell, 25 AM. U.L.
REV. 971, 1001-02 & n.154 (1976).
223. See 553 F.2d at 801-02.
224. See Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (B & J Investment Co.), 214
N.L.R.B. 562, 87 L.R.R.M. 1424 (1974); Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
(Church's Fried Chicken, Inc.), 183 N.L.R.B. 1032, 74 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1970).
In B & Jlnvestment Co., a general contractor, who was not signatory to any collective
bargaining agreement, was pressured to sign an agreement to cease doing business with
nonunion contractors. The Board upheld the agreement. The Connell Court noted that it
was not ascertainable whether the Board had considered the absence of a collective
bargaining relationship, 421 U.S. at 631-32 n.10; see note 115 supra.
225. NLRB General Counsel Memorandum Release No. R-1343 (July 2, 1974) reprinted
in LAB. YEARBOOK, supra note 116, at 298; see notes 116-17 & accompanying text supra.
226. Plumber's Local 100 (Hagler Construction Co.) N.L.R.B. Case No. 16-CC-447
(1975).
227. Memorandum for the National Labor Relations Board as Amicus Curiae, Connell
Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
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construction site. 228 Since Local 100 did not represent or seek to represent Connell's employees, Local 100 could hardly claim that the clause
protected the interests of any of Connell's employees. In the Court's
view, the clause merely served Local 100's interest in the "top-down"
organizing of subcontractors.2 29 The Court concluded that the lack of a
collective bargaining relationship and the failure of the clause to be
limited to particular jobsites struck a fatal blow to Local 100's agreement
with Connell. The Court however, left unanswered questions concerning
the scope of the proviso and the prerequisites for antitrust exemption.
In a significant development, the NLRB's General Counsel has issued
a detailed memorandum delineating his interpretation of the Connell
23
requirements for compliance with the construction industry proviso. 1
These requirements provide that when an employer and a union are
parties to a lawful collective bargaining relationship, whether developed
under section 9(a) 231 or section 8(f) 232 of the Act, they may agree to a
section 8(e) clause, 233 if:

1) The clause is operational only at times when the employer
has employees represented by the union.
2) The clause applies only to sites at which the employer has
employees represented by the union.
3) In the case of a section 8(f) relationship, such 234
relationship
is not the consequence of section 8(b)(7) picketing.
The General Counsel also determined that a collective bargaining relationship was not required in circumstances in which the representative of
a unionized subcontractor on a jobsite had agreed with the general
contractor that he should not hire nonunion subcontractors. This conclu228. 421 U.S. at 630; see Essex County & Vicinity Dist. Council of Carpenters v.
NLRB, 332 F.2d 636, 640 (3d Cir. 1964).
229. 421 U.S. at 632.
230. NLRB General Counsel Memorandum Release No. 76-57 (December 15, 1976)
[hereinafter G.C. Memo, 76-57]. Under § 3(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970), the
General Counsel is given the power to issue complaints on behalf of the Board.
231. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
232. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1970). Section 8(f) refers to the ability of a labor organization
and an employer to enter into pre-hire agreements when the labor organization has not
been selected by a majority of the represented employees. Under a § 8(f) contract, after
the employees are hired they are considered by the Board to be represented by that labor
organization, which therefore, has an interest in them. See Zidell Explorations, Inc., 175
N.L.R.B. 887 (1969).
233. G.C. Memo, 76-57, supra note 230, at 20.
234. Id. The Board has held that picketing for a § 8(f) contract is violative of § 8(b)(7)
which restricts "top-down" organizing. See Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
142 N.L.R.B. 1132, enforced, 331 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 889
(1964).
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sion is clearly warranted by the Court's suggestion that the proviso might
extend not only to agreements "in the context of [a] collective-bargaining relationship" but also "possibly to common-situs relationships on

particular job sites as well. "235
Under section 8(f), an employer and union in the construction industry
are permitted to enter into "pre-hire" agreements in which a collective
bargaining relationship is deemed established before any employees are
hired. 236 Since the union is the representative of the employees under a
lawful collective bargaining agreement, the union has a "legitimate interest in assuring that these represented employees are not required to work
alongside nonunion employees. 237 Therefore the union and employer

can include a section 8(e) clause within the "pre-hire" contract requiring
the general contractor to use only unionized subcontractors.

28

The

clause, however, cannot be effective before an employer actually hires
employees or when no employees represented by the union are present at
239
a particular jobsite.
Perhaps the "most far reaching position taken by the General
Counsel" and likely "to be the bitterest bone of contention" is his

determination that the proviso does not protect subcontracting agreements benefiting "named" unions. 240 This particular point has prompted
more inquiries than any other.24 ' Parties before the General Counsel
have attempted to circumvent this provision by having the restrictive
subcontracting agreement describe the type of union with which the
subcontractor must have a relationship, in terms of the benefits received
by members.2 42 Such a clause would undoubtedly reflect the benefits
offered by the union seeking the agreement. This type of hybrid union
235. 421 U.S. at 633; see note 147 supra. See also G. C. Memo, 76-57, supra note 230,
at 10 & n.20.
236. The unusual economics of the construction industry (short term projects, the need
to calculate labor costs in advance, and the need for a readily available supply of skilled
labor) convinced Congress of the necessity of permitting "pre-hire" contracts. See G.C.
Memo, 76-57, supra note 230, at 7 & n. 14. See also S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2318, 2344-45.
237. G.C. Memo, 76-57, supra note 230, at 11I.
238. In order to satisfy the "purpose" of the construction industry proviso, the
employees covered by the "pre-hire" contract presumably are considered unionized. In
that regard, the contract cannot limit the subcontracting to unit work such that nonunit
work can be performed by nonunion subcontractors. See G.C. Memo, 76-57, supra note
230, at 20.
239. See Id. at 8.
240. Interview with Peter Mirsky, NLRB Attorney, General Counsel's Advice Section
in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 19, 1977); see notes 153-55 & accompanying text supra.
241. Interview, supra note 240.
242. Id.
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signatory-union standards clause should be viewed as no less a "topdown" organizing tool than the "particular" union clause, since the
union seeking the clause would invariably be the beneficiary. Moreover,
such a clause would appear to negate the section 7 right of employees to
choose their own bargaining representatives.
In a supplemental memorandum, the General Counsel also addressed
the problem of the parties' intention in drafting and applying a particular
subcontracting clause.2 43 The memorandum stated that if the parties
entered into an impermissibly broad agreement, the parties may offer
evidence that it was their mutual intention, at the time of the agreement,
that the clause operate only when represented employees were present,
and that the clause had been applied consistently with that interpretation. 244 This determination comports with the general rule that a violation
of section 8(e) turns on contractual intent and application.2 45
The General Counsel has done an exacting job of interpreting
Connell's proviso guidelines. The Memorandum's effectiveness in discouraging restrictive subcontracting clauses unrelated to the problem of
jobsite friction will, to some degree, depend upon the ingenuity of
construction industry unions in devising circumventing clauses. 24 To a
greater degree, its effectiveness depends upon the extent to which the
Board affirms those guidelines.
X.

CONCLUSION

The General Counsel's handling of the construction industry proviso
issue has interjected needed clarity into this troublesome area of the law.
Hopefully, the Board will move quickly to implement the General
Counsel's guidelines in decisional law, especially the "particular" union
provision. That provision offers profound implications for the traditional
craft unions' hold over construction industry employees and presents a
viable route for the introduction of new labor organizations in the area.
One can expect intense litigation over that provision. A possible alternative approach for construction unions in the wake of the Connell
guidelines would be to conclude union standards agreements by which
contractors agree to subcontract only to firms having wage and working
243. NLRB General Counsel Memorandum, No. 77-2 (Jan. 10, 1977).
244. Id. at I.
245. See Teamsters Local 386 (Construction Material Trucking Inc.), 198 N.L.R.B.
1038 (1972).
246. For instance, a union representing the general contractor's employees could easily
avoid the particular jobsite limitation by having a requirement incorporated into its
collective bargaining agreement with the general contractor that at least one of the general
contractor's employees be present at each of his construction sites.
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condition standards equal to or exceeding those of area union workers.
Under Apex, there should be no problem with antitrust liability in removing these standards from competition.
Lower courts have tended to minimize the impact of the restrictive
implications of the Connell decision. 24 7 This may be due, in part, to the
ambiguity of the decision and to the narrow context of its underlying
facts. This suggests that the Allen Bradley-Pennington-JewelTea line of
cases will continue to exert substantial influence in lower court opinions.
The courts have continually demonstrated that they are ill-suited to the
task of reconciling the broad proscriptions of the antitrust laws with the
regulatory scheme of the labor statutes. The Supreme Court's view of
the proper balance between these policies has often been at odds with
that of Congress. More recently, Congress indicated that it considers the
Connell decision contrary to congressional purposes in the accommodation of the antitrust and labor policies. 2 4s Congress, however, has been
unable to muster the votes necessary to reverse the effects of Connell or
to inject needed clarity in this troublesome area of the law. Until it does
so, one should not be surprised at the courts' imposition of their own
view of the proper balance to be achieved between labor and antitrust.
Robert G. Conway*
247. In Carpenters v. General Contractors, 404 F. Supp. 1067 (N.D. Calif. 1975), the
court stated that disputes between unions and employers do not normally give rise to
violations of the antitrust laws. Only an agreement between a union and employer to
conspire in some respect gives rise to an antitrust violation. In Ackerman-Chillingworth v.
Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 405 F. Supp. 99 (D. Hawaii 1975), the court discussed
the labor exemption in terms of Allen Bradley without discussing Connell.
248. The criticism of Connell came in the somewhat unrelated context of hearings on
the Common Site Picketing Bill, H.R. 5900 & S. 1479, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See
Kilberg, Interpretation of the Supreme Court's Decision in Connell Construction Company
and its Impact on the Situs Picketing Bill, 127 B.N.A. Daily Lab. Rep. (July 1, 1975).
* At the time of the publication of this comment, the author was Counsel to Boardmember John C. Truesdale of the National Labor Relations Board. The opinions expressed are the author's own and not those of the National Labor Relations Board.

